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AGENDA SETTING AND BARGAINING 
POWER: 
The Mexican State versus Transnational 
Automobile Corporations 
By DOUGLAS C. BENNETT and KENNETH E. SHARPE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IN this paper, we will explore the often conflictual bargaining rela-tions between transnational corporations (TN Cs) and the host gov-
ernments of less developed countries (LDCs). Our attention will focus 
on the issues of agenda setting and the sources of bargaining power in 
a specific case-the conflict that surrounded the creation of the Mexican 
automobile industry ( 1960-1964) .1 
When the administration of Adolfo Lopez Mateos took office in 
December 1958, there was no significant automobile industry in Mexico. 
All cars sold in Mexico were either imported whole or as CKD ( com-
pletely knocked-down) kits that needed only to be assembled. The 
new government considered the industry to be an important candidate 
for import substitution, one that-through the manifold forward and 
backward linkages of auto manufacture-could help to reinvigorate a 
growth strategy that was showing signs of having exhausted its "easy 
stage." When the automobile firms that did exist in Mexico showed 
no inclination to increase the scope of their operations, the government 
of Lopez Mateos sought to use the state's power to compel the local 
* This article was prepared in connection with a research planning activity on the 
political economy of the Latin American automobile industry sponsored by the Joint 
Committee on Latin American Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies 
and the Social Science Research Council. We would like to thank Morris Blachman, 
Susan Eckstein, Michael Fleet, Louis Goodman, Rhys Jenkins, Richard Kronish, Ken 
Mericle, David Moore, and Miguel Wionczek for useful critical comments on an 
earlier draft. Funding from the following foundations made possible the larger research 
project of which this paper is a part: The Tinker Foundation, the Social Science 
Research Council, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Doherty 
Foundation. 
1 Much of the data in this paper are drawn from personal interviews with executives 
of the automobile industry and with government officials (in Nacional Financiera, 
Banco de Mexico, and the Ministries of Finance and of Industry and Commerce) who 
were active in the bargaining during period under discussion. The article is concerned 
only with automobile policy; truck policy, however, raises similar considerations and 
in some cases was regulated in a similar way. A number of the issues discussed here 
wW be more fully developed in a larger work now in progress. 
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58 WORLD POLITICS 
manufacture of a substantial portion of each vehicle. In view of the 
size of the Mexican automobile market and the prevailing economies 
of scale in the industry, the government wanted to limit the domestic 
industry to very few firms. Because of the intense competition for new 
markets in the international automobile industry, however, the issue 
of limiting the number of firms-a matter of the structure of the in-
dustry-became a particularly controversial one in the bargaining that 
ensued between the Mexican Government and the major transnational 
automobile firms. Other proposals put forward by the Mexican Gov-
ernment-among them certain restrictions on the behavior of the firms 
that would constitute the industry and on the ownership of these firms 
-also became issues of contention because the firms believed them to 
be a threat to their global strategies. Other proposals were not so open 
to dispute, however. The transnational firms mobilized their power to 
resist the more uncongenial proposals; on some issues, including the 
key issue of limiting the number of firms, they succeeded. 
In what has become the classic formulation, Charles Kindleberger 
conceptualized the relationships between transnational firms and the 
governments of the host countries with regard to direct investment 
as one of bilateral monopoly: one buyer and one seller of a foreign 
investment project. "In a typical situation, a company earns more 
abroad than the minimum it would accept and a country's net social 
benefits from the company's presence are greater than the minimum 
it would accept ... with a wide gap between the maximum and mini-
mum demands by the two parties."2 Thus viewed, the outside limits 
of acceptability could be located by means of economic theory but the 
precise terms of the investment would be a function of the relative 
bargaining strengths of the two parties. Equilibrium analysis must give 
way to power analysis; economics to political science. 
This balance-of-bargaining-power approach has proved to be a useful 
conceptualization in studies of relations between TNCs and the gov-
ernments of their host countries, 3 but it is marred by certain recurrent 
2 Charles Kindleberger and Bruce Herrick, Economic Development (3d ed., New 
York: McGraw-Hill 1977), 320. 
3 Among recent literature on this subject, see Theodore H. Moran, "Multinational 
Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependentistas and Non-Dependentistas," 
International Organization, xxx11 (Winter 1978), 79-roo; Moran, Multinational Cor-
porations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press 1975); Edith T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing 
Countries: The International Petroleum Industry (London: Allen and Unwin 1968); 
Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises 
(New York: Basic Books 1971), chap. 3; Raymond F. Mikesell, ed., Foreign Invest-
ment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies of Investor-Host Country 
Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1971), chap. 2. For one of the few case 
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AGENDA SETTING AND BARGAINING POWER 59 
weaknesses that show its kinship with the pluralist approach to power 
in American political science. We will focus our attention on two key 
issues in particular: 
(I) Studies utilizing the balance-of-bargaining-power framework 
have tended to take the agenda of bargaining as given. They have con-
centrated solely on those issues that happen to be topics of conflict and 
have failed to ask how this agenda was set. Which actors and which 
interests have been included in the bargaining, and which have been 
excluded? Why are some issues and not others contested by the parties 
to the bargaining? 
(2) There are weaknesses as well in explaining the outcomes of 
bargaining encounters. Sometimes there is a failure to distinguish be-
tween potential power and actual power, and thus a failure to explore 
obstacles to the full utilization of potential power. Of equal importance 
is a tendency to conceptualize potential power as consisting simply in 
each actor's possession of certain resources. That approach gives little 
consideration to the relationships or circumstances that may allow a 
particular attribute to serve as a source of potential power. 
II. AGENDA SETTING 
Like the behavioral/ pluralist approach to the study of power ( to 
which they perhaps owe unwitting allegiance), studies of bargaining 
conflicts between TNCs and the LDCs' governments have tended to 
overlook questions of agenda setting. These studies have accorded con-
sideration solely to overt, "visible" conflicts. They have ignored the 
question of why some issues and not others became subjects of bargain-
ing and conflict. Bachrach and Baratz's discussion of the "other face 
of power" first called the attention of political scientists to the ques-
tions of agenda setting; they were concerned with the utilization of 
power to prevent some issues from ever forming part of the bargaining 
agenda.4 There are other considerations in agenda setting that are 
equally important, however. Instead of excluding certain issues from 
the bargaining agenda, some key actors may be excluded. As a conse-
quence, their particular concerns and interests may not be articulated 
unless some other actor has reason to put them forward. In cases where 
the state is involved in a bargaining situation, it may-for reasons that 
studies of a manufacturing industry, see Gary Gereffi, "Drug Firms and Dependency 
in Mexico: The Case of the Steroid Hormone Industry," International Organization, 
XXXII (Winter 1978)' 237-86. 
4 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 56 (December 1962), 947-52. 
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60 WORLD POLITICS 
have to do with its social foundations-speak only for certain classes. 
In Mexico, for example, labor and national entrepreneurs both had 
interests that were deeply affected by the policy toward the automobile 
industry. Nevertheless, the bargaining over that policy principally in-
volved only the Mexican Government and the major transnational au-
tomobile firms that were based in the United States. The voice of labor 
was completely excluded, and national entrepreneurs played only a 
minor role. The exclusion of these actors did not necessarily entail the 
exclusion of their interests, however: in the bargaining, the Mexican 
state did articulate some of the interests of the bourgeoisie, though the 
interests of labor went largely unrepresented. 
Noting how and why certain actors ( and their interests) are ex-
cluded from the bargaining provides one kind of insight into the for-
mation of the bargaining agenda, but there is a further important point 
to be made about agenda setting. In focusing strictly on overt, visible 
conflicts-and in taking these issues as the given agenda of bargaining 
-studies using the balance-of-bargaining-power approach have tended 
to understate the areas of agreement between TNCs and the LDCs' 
governments. In studies that concentrate solely on points over which 
there is conflict, the two actors are often presented as if they were an-
tagonists across the board. The bargaining agenda can be more fully 
and deeply understood if we attend to areas of agreement ( over which 
there is little or no need to bargain) as well as to areas of disagreement. 
All the interests of the actors included in the bargaining must be ex-
plicated in order to locate points of confiict and of convergence among 
them. 
In so proceeding, we regard interests as having an objective ( or 
"real") basis. A careful examination of the goals and circumstances of 
each actor will reveal its fundamental interests. By contrast, the stand-
ard procedure of the pluralist approach to power considers interests to 
be merely subjective: an actor's interests are whatever it says they are, 
and no further analysis or explication is sought.5 In basic outline, the 
interests of our two central actors seem straightforward: the automobile 
TNCs wanted to maximize broad international earnings, while the 
Mexican Government sought to promote industrial growth. But there 
were a number of strategies by which each could have pursued its cen-
tral goal; thus, subjective considerations entered into the formation of 
these interests as well. The adoption of particular strategies was not 
5 For a discussion of the concept of "interest" in analyses of power, and a critique of 
purely subjective conceptions, see Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: 
Macmillan 1974). 
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AGENDA SETTING AND BARGAINING POWER 61 
a matter of purely voluntary choice by the actors; rather, it was shaped 
by the national and international coritexts in which the actors found 
themselves. An examination of the bases of the interests of these actors 
will not only allow us to locate the points at which these interests con-
verge and conflict ( constituting the bargaining agenda), but also to 
anticipate how changes in the contexts of action prompt changes of 
strategy and interest. 
THE INTERESTS OF TNCS AND THEIR RELATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
Two of the central characteristics of the international automobile 
industry in the late 1950s and early 1960s were its high ( and increasing) 
concentration and the internationalization of competition among the 
surviving firms. 
In the very earliest years of the automobile industry, literally hun-
dreds of firms were producing cars in the United States, Britain, France, 
Germany, and other industrialized countries. The assembly line and 
other scale-of-production economies, however, and the substantial de-
gree of risk in the industry, served to promote steadily increasing con-
centration." In the United States, the number of firms producing auto-
mobiles dropped from nine to four in the two decades following World 
War II. In Europe, a similar process of concentration was taking place; 
each major producing country tended to have one national firm that 
competed against a number of smaller foreign (usually American) 
subsidiaries.7 The Japanese automobile industry was later in developing, 
coming to maturity only very late in the 1950s; but here, too, four firms 
accounted for 82 percent of production by 1961; further concentration 
was actively promoted by the government. By 1973, the worldwide 
process of concentration had reached the point where two firms ( Gen-
eral Motors and Ford) were responsible for over 40 percent of total 
automobile sales; the eight largest firms produced about 85 percent. 8 
Changes in the shape of competition among the major automobile 
producers have been both a cause and a consequence of this increasing 
concentration. Prior to World War II and extending into the 1950s, 
firms sought to take advantage of economies of scale through longer 
6 On the role that risk plays in the automobile industry, see Lawrence J. White, 
The Automobile Industry Since 1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971), 
7-9, 44-49· 
7 Rhys Owen Jenkins, Dependent Industrialization in Latin America: The Automo-
tive Industry in Argentina, Chile and Mexico (New York: Praeger 1977), 20. 
8 The largest eight, in order, were G.M., Ford, Chrysler, Fiat, Volkswagen, Toyota, 
Nissan, and Renault. "New Strategies for a World Auto Market," Business Week, 
November 24, 1973, p. 38. 
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production runs in order to lower costs. Subsequently, non-price forms 
of competition have predominated. In the United States in particular, 
annual model changes and the need to supply a full range of models 
have been important factors in increasing concentration.9 Until the 
mid-I95os, furthermore, the major producers enjoyed a well-protected 
market in their home base and competed internationally only to the 
extent of exporting assembled vehicles to less developed countries. The 
American firms, whose home market was not as protected and who 
had substantial foreign assembly and manufacturing operations (par-
ticular! y in Europe), constituted a significant exception to this pattern. 
Since the mid-I95os (i.e., since the return of a buyer's market), how-
ever, there has been a substantial interpenetration among the leading 
producing countries. In Europe, it was facilitated by the E.E.C., while 
in the United States it manifested itself by the invasion of the market 
by European and Japanese small cars. 
In the developing countries, this internationalization of competition 
signaled the end of the geographic division of markets among the 
major producers (the U.S. firms having previously concentrated on 
Latin America, and the French and British firms on their former col-
onies, and so forth). The slowdown in growth of the major industrial-
ized markets led first the European firms ( spearheaded by Volks-
wagen) and later the Japanese firms to begin a worldwide export drive. 
U.S. hegemony in Latin America was threatened, and this area "be-
came a battleground in the competitive struggle within the automobile 
industry."10 
As it turned out, the new interest of European and Japanese firms in 
Latin America coincided with the decision of a number of Latin 
American governments, including Mexico's, to promote domestic man-
ufacturing of automobiles. 
THE STATE'S INTERESTS AND THE MEXICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The problem of the interests of the state is particularly difficult con-
ceptually, especially in view of the prevailing tendency (following 
Weber) to identify the state in terms of means rather than of purposes. 
A full theory of the state is beyond our scope here, but such a theory 
would need to view the state as having distinct and discernible inter-
ests. These interests can not simply be deduced a priori (from the 
"nature of the capitalist state," for example), but must be explained 
9 White (fn. 6). See also J. A. Menge, "Style Change Costs as a Market Weapon," 
Quarterly Economic Journal, Vol. 76 (November r96z), 632-47. 
10 Jenkins ( fn. 7), 49. 
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by the historical manner in which a state comes to rest on particular 
social class foundations and by the manner in which it institutionalizes 
solutions to problems in the domestic and international political econ-
omy.11 What, then, were the outlines of the Mexican state's interests? 
By 1958, the policy of import substitution was firmly entrenched in 
Mexico's strategy of economic growth. It had started with the insula-
tion of its domestic market during the Depression and World War II; 
following the war, a policy apparatus (import licenses, tariffs) was 
instituted to maintain the protection of the domestic market. Between 
1940 and 1960, Mexico's G.N.P. increased at an annual rate of 6.3 per-
cent, with the manufacturing sector ( at an average annual growth 
rate of 7.7 percent), setting the pace. 
The particular character of Mexico's strategy of import substitution 
was conditioned by the changing social foundations of the Mexican 
regime-especially its attitude toward the domestic private sector, la-
bor, and foreign investment. Despite the strains of social radicalism in 
the Mexican revolution, primary reliance for investments for economic 
growth had been placed on the private sector. Lacking a national bour-
geoisie that could undertake the necessary entrepreneurial activities, 
the state deliberately created such a class ( one which, as it grew, be-
came increasing! y capable of influencing governmental policy) .12 
Official policy encouraged private investment in a number of ways: cor-
porate and personal income taxes were kept low; an orthodox mone-
tary policy ( desarrollo establizador), adopted in 1954, allowed the gov-
ernment to finance its expenditures in an essentially non-inflationary 
manner through the use of complex reserve requirements and selective 
credit controls that applied to the private banking system; the state 
provided long-term, low-interest loans through state investment banks 
and made investments in infrastructure and basic industries ( steel, 
petroleum refining); and government policies allowed for the emer-
gence of a skewed pattern of income distribution through which an 
affluent upper middle class of sufficient size spurred import-substituted 
consumer-goods industries despite low per capita income. Labor peace 
was maintained politically through the corporatist organization of the 
ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the co-optation of 
labor leaders, and occasional repression. The resulting low wages and 
relative docility of urban and rural workers helped to encourage con-
11 For a fuller elaboration, see Bennett and Sharpe, "The State as Banker and as 
Entrepreneur: The Last Resort Character of the Mexican State's Economic Interven-
tions, r9r7-r970," Comparative Politics, forthcoming. 
12 For a more detailed discussion, see ibid. 
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64 WORLD POLITICS 
tinued high rates of investment.13 Thus, while the national bourgeoisie 
was becoming an increasingly important actor whose interests had to 
be taken into account by the state, labor and its interests were usually 
excluded; this pattern was to characterize the bargaining in the auto 
industry in the early 1960s. 
The Mexican state served domestic business interests in another im-
portant way: the revolutionary heritage had made economic nation-
alism a hallmark of government policy for more than fifty years. In 
some sectors-natural resources, banking, insurance, transportation, 
communications, and so forth-foreign investment was excluded alto-
gether. Such was not the case in manufacturing: import substitution, 
particularly as it moved into more sophisticated goods (such as auto-
mobiles), required the technology, management capabilities, and mar-
keting skills of transnational corporations. Since 1950, however, the 
official emphasis toward foreign investment in manufacturing has in-
creasingly been on Mexicanization. Foreign investment is required to 
be associated with a firm the majority of whose capital is Mexican; 
this policy allows the participation of TNCs in the economy while 
preserving a role for the national bourgeoisie.14 
THE MEXICAN STATE AND THE AUTO TRANSNATIONALS: CONVERGENCE 
AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
The reliance on private investment, the political control of labor, and 
the expanding middle class of consumers proved attractive to foreign 
investment, Mexicanization notwithstanding. After the Second World 
War, as the policy of import substitution coincided with the expansion-
ary thrust of U.S. transnational corporations, direct foreign investment 
in manufacturing increased rapidly-from $32 million to $602 million 
between 1940 and 1960. In the automobile industry and other manu-
facturing, there was a particularly strong convergence of interests be-
tween the government's economic policy and the corporate strategies 
of the transnational firms. 
The government had encouraged the assembly of vehicles from im-
13 Details may be found in Roger D. Hansen, The Politics of Mexican Development 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1971): Susan Eckstein, Poverty of Revolution (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press 1977); William P. Glade, Jr. and Charles Anderson, 
The Political Economy of Mexico (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1968). 
14 On Mexican policy toward foreign investment, see Harry K. Wright, Foreign 
Enterprise in Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1971); and 
Douglas Bennett, Morris Blachman, and Kenneth Sharpe, "Mexico and Multinational 
Corporations: An Explanation of State Action," in Joseph Grunwald, ed., Latin Amer-
ica and World Economy: A Changing International Order (Beverly Hills: Sage Publi-
cations 1978). 
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ported CKD kits as early as 1925. Ford took advantage of the modest 
tariff reductions offered and began assembly in 1926; General Motors 
followed suit in 1937; and a Mexican firm, Fabricas Auto-Mex, started 
assembling Chryslers in 1938. When import substitution was adopted 
as a conscious strategy after World War II, import quotas and addi-
tional tariff advantages promoted the creation of a number of other 
assembly operations. There was little conflict of interest here: shipment 
of parts in CKD kits still allowed the longer production runs ( and 
lower per-unit costs) in the TN Cs' home plants which the stiffened 
international competition required. In auto manufacture, economies of 
scale are very much lower in assembly operations than they are in the 
fabrication of motors or in body stamping. In addition, domestic (Mexi-
can) assembly resulted in some economies in transportation costs.15 
When the government's policy moved from a concern with assembly 
toward an interest in the manufacture of vehicles, however, the con-
vergence of interest between the Mexican state and the transnational 
automobile firms began to disintegrate. 
The policy started to change when the Lopez Mateos Administration 
came to power in December 1958. The growth "miracle" that had been 
sustained for nearly twenty years was in serious difficulty. The "easy 
stage" of import substitution was facing exhaustion: Mexico had al-
ready initiated the domestic manufacture of many simple consumer 
goods, and investments were needed in certain industrial sectors if 
growth was to continue. The attention of economic policy makers fo-
cused on a number of candidates, among them the automobile industry. 
The Mexican automobile industry in 1958 consisted of eleven firms 
that were operating assembly plants. In addition, a small number of 
assembled vehicles were imported by a few other companies. The 
Mexican consumer could choose from among 44 makes and 117 models. 
Ford, General Motors, and Fabricas Auto-Mex dominated the industry; 
between them, they accounted for three-quarters of the automobiles 
sold. Ford and G.M. were mo percent foreign-owned subsidiaries; 
Fabricas Auto-Mex, long wholly owned by the Azcarraga family, sold 
one-third of its equity to Chrysler in 1959. The other assembly plants 
were smaller and wholly Mexican-owned; they operated under licenses 
from foreign manufacturers. 
A number of considerations suggested that the automobile industry 
be a candidate for the implementation of the new policy. Domestic 
manufacture of automobiles (as opposed to their mere assembly) would 
15 Jenkins ( fn. 7), 39-40. 
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stimulate a broad array of other industries through backward and for-
ward linkage; it would be expected to further not only an auto-parts 
industry, but also the sectors that would serve it: machine tools, forg-
ings, paint, glass, steel and aluminum, plastics, and so forth. Automo-
bile manufacturing would thus create a large number of new jobs. 
There would be savings in foreign exchange: imports of parts and 
finished vehicles accounted for approximately rr percent of Mexico's 
total import bill during the r95os; foreign ownership of the major 
firms ( with resultant profit remittances) tended to exacerbate this 
problem. The fact that Argentina and Brazil had already moved to 
start up their own automobile manufacture set an example, but also 
constituted a threat; if Mexico did not follow suit, these countries might 
pressure Mexico to open its markets to their auto exports under the 
terms of the Latin American Free Trade Area agreements.16 
The groundwork was done by the Committee for Planning and De-
velopment of the Automobile Industry, an interministerial technical 
body constituted in 1959 and headed by the state's principal develop-
ment bank, Nacional Financiera (NAFIN). Represented were the Min-
istry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and the 
Bank of Mexico. Final responsibility for formulating and administer-
ing the policy rested with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. 
On the basis of considerable staff research and visits to a number of 
countries (including several that had recently initiated the manufac-
ture of automobiles), but without much consultation with the trans-
national automobile firms-the bargaining came later-the Committee 
prepared and approved a report.17 It constituted the initial policy po-
sition of the government's economic tecnicos. 
Because there were a number of these proposals, we will divide them 
into three types: proposals concerning the structure of the industry, 
proposals concerning the behavior or conduct of the firms, and pro-
posals concerning the ownership of the firms.18 
16 See the statement of Lopez Mateos's Minister of Industry and Commerce, Raul 
Salinas Lozano, in Comercio Exterior, August 1964, pp. 547-48; and Salinas Lozano's 
introduction to Hector Vazquez Tercero, Una decada de politica sabre la industria 
automotriz (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Tecnos 1975), 5-ro. 
In interviews, a number of officials of the Ministry of Commerce maintained that the 
balance of payments was not a primary concern (since domestic manufacture would 
create its own imports for machinery and raw materials). In their view, industrial 
growth and employment were the principal concerns. 
17 Nacional Financiera, Elementos para una politica de desarrollo de la fabricaci6n de 
vehiculos automotrices en Mexico (Mexico, D.F.: Nacional Financiera 196o). 
18 The concepts of industry structure and firm behavior are drawn from industrial 
organization theory: see Toe S. Bain, Industrial Organization (New York: Wiley 1959). 
The presumption underlying the theory is that structure affects firm behavior, and 
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A. PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE INDUSTRY'S STRUCTURE 
r. Limitation of the number of firms in the terminal industry (pro-
duction of finished vehicles) to three to five firms 
2. Limitation of the terminal firms to motor machining and final 
assembly ( other manufacturing to be reserved for a supplier or 
auto-parts industry) 
3. Creation of a central body-stamping plant. 
B. PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE F!Rl\IS' BEHAVIOR 
r. Production of at least 60 percent of the content of vehicles (meas-
ured by direct cost) in Mexico 
2. Limitations on the number of acceptable makes and models pro-
duced by each firm 
3. Limitations on frequency of model changes (freezing of model 
years) 
4. Standardization of certain parts. 
C. PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE OWNERSHIP OF F!Rl\IS 
r. Mexican majority ownership of firms in the terminal industry 
2. Mexican majority ownership of firms in the supplier industry. 
67 
These proposals followed from the government's conception of what 
was required to sustain economic growth, but the transnational auto-
mobile firms saw a number of the proposals as threatening their cor-
porate strategies. The bargaining that followed the emergence of this 
conflict of interests unfolded in two stages. The first stage encompassed 
the various discussions between the firms and the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce prior to the promulgation of the Manufacturing Decree 
of August 1962, and concerned the terms of the Decree; the second 
stage consisted in the submission and approval of applications by vari-
ous firms to manufacture under the terms of the Decree. Issues of own-
ership and firm behavior were contested in the first stage. Ford, Gen-
eral Motors, and Fabricas Auto-Mex were the major actors: they were 
the only transnational auto firms who had already invested substantial 
capital in Mexico; together, they dominated the Mexican market. The 
number of firms to be admitted-the principal issue of industry struc-
ture-was discussed in both stages; consequently, all firms applying 
for entry (whether U.S.-based or not) participated in the negotiations. 
behavior in turn leads to performance ( the type of contribution that an industry makes 
to the functioning of an economy) that can be judged against certain standards. 
I.O. theory, like economic theory more generally, considers ownership to be irrelevant, 
assuming a rational actor to be directing the firm. A different presumption has under-
lain the policies of the Mexican Government (among others) toward direct foreign 
investment: that the nationality of the ownership does make a difference in the firm's 
behavior, and thus in performance. 
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The bargaining involved four closely related issues. 
( 1) The requirement of 60 percent local content. The government's 
interest here was clear: this requirement was to move the Mexican auto 
industry from assembly to manufacture, and thus to stimulate further 
import substitution. 
The TNCs, however, were not eager to commence manufacturing 
operations on this basis. The new investments would be far greater 
than those already in assembly plants. (The TNCs who merely licensed 
Mexican-owned assembly operations had yet to commit any capital in-
vestment to Mexico.) The Mexican market was still quite small-only 
65,000 autos and trucks in 1962; manufacturing in Mexico would mean 
the surrender of important economies of scale. Finally, there were seri-
ous difficulties of supply, since the existing auto-parts industry had 
been limited mainly to the manufacture of simple replacement parts. 
The creation of an adequate parts industry would be a substantial 
undertaking, involving considerations of quality and availability as 
well as of cost. In some cases, the necessary raw materials were not 
available at acceptable prices or levels of quality. 
Surprisingly, however, the TNCs did not take a position in bargain-
ing that was totally set against auto manufacturing in Mexico; the 
explanation lies in the emergent dynamics of internationalized compe-
tition among the firms in the world automobile oligopoly. As 
Knickerbocker has shown, direct foreign investment in competitive, 
product-pioneering, manufacturing oligopolies tends to conform to a 
follow-the-leader pattern of defensive investment. "Rival firms in an 
industry composed of a few large firms counter one another's moves by 
making similar moves themselves" as a risk-minimizing strategy.10 
When one firm in the oligopoly makes an investment, other firms de-
fend their positions by making similar investments. In the present case, 
the Mexican Government (rather than an independent investment de-
cision by one of the firms) triggered the process; as soon as one of the 
firms agreed ( early in the policy-making process, Ford had expressed a 
willingness to commence manufacturing under the right conditions), 
the other firms were quick to follow. Eighteen firms submitted applica-
tions when the final Decree stipulating automobile manufacturing 
was promulgated in August 1962.20 Thus, although it may not have 
19 Frederick T. Knickerbocker, Oligopolistic Reaction and Multinational Enterprise 
(Boston: Harvard University School of Business Administration 1973), r. Cf. Jenkins 
(fn. 7), 40-42. For a discussion of oligopolistic reaction in another industry in Mexico, 
see Gary Gereffi (fn. 3), 271-72. 
20 The same pattern of oligopolistic reaction is to be seen all over Latin America. 
When Brazil imposed its manufacturing requirements in 1956, rr firms commenced 
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been in the interests of the individual firms to commence manufactur-
ing operations in Mexico, they were prepared to do so rather than risk 
the possibility of that market's being conceded to a competitor. 
Consequently, the requirement that, on average, 60 percent of each 
vehicle be manufactured in Mexico never became an issue of conten-
tion in the bargaining between the Mexican state and the transnational 
automobile firms. 21 
(2) Limiting the number of firms-the central issue of the industry's 
structure. Strictly limiting the number of firms to no more than five 
was a key provision of the Nacional Financiera Report; it became the 
most important one in the bargaining. This proposal constituted the 
Mexican Government's attempt to learn from the mistakes of unre-
stricted entry of automobile manufacturers in Brazil and Argentina 
( eleven and twenty-one, respectively). The Mexican market was not 
expected to exceed a few hundred thousand vehicles annually within 
the next decade. Allowing the market to become fragmented among 
many firms, each with a multiplicity of makes and models, would 
result in overcapitalization and excess capacity in the industry, and 
would lead to higher consumer prices and thus lower demand. The 
industry could achieve the significant economies of scale available in 
automobile manufacture only if the number of firms could be limited.22 
manufacturing operations; when Argentina announced its policy in 1959, 22 firms 
made the necessary investments; in Chile, 20; in Venezuela, 16; in Peru, 13. Jenkins 
(fn. 7), 56. 
21 It is worth mentioning that this requirement was made palatable by being consid-
erably lower than the mandatory levels of local content that had been required by 
Brazil and Argentina a few years earlier, as well as certain attractive tax exemptions. 
On the latter, see Jenkins (fn. 7), 54-55. Jenkins takes pains to argue, however, that 
these tax incentives themselves were not responsible for the large number of firms 
that were willing to commence manufacturing. With regard to the 6o percent of local 
content, it was the intention of the Mexican policy makers to start at this lower level 
in order to minimize the inflationary consequences of the transition to domestic manu-
facture (a low level of inflation being an important goal of the government's policy). 
With the industry's growth in size and efficiency, a gradual increase to higher levels 
was expected. 
22 On these economies of scale, see White (fn. 6), 38-53, and Jenkins (fn. 7), 265-71. 
Even such otherwise staunch defenders of free trade as I.M.D. Little, Tibor Scitovsky, 
and Maurice Scott advocate the use of investment controls by developing countries in 
order to limit the number of firms in an industry with significant economies of scale; 
they single out the automobile industry as an example. Industry and Trade in Some 
Developing Countries: A Comparative Study (London: Oxford University Press 1970), 
342. 
Another proposal put forward in the Nacional Financiera Report-the establishment 
of a single, central body-stamping plant-was aimed at the same goal. The plant, to be 
developed by Altos Homos, the state'.s steel firm, would make it possible for all the 
manufacturers to use the same body stamping presses, with only the stamping dies 
needing to be changed for each firm. If models were extended for several years each, 
these dies could be used to nearly full efficiency. 
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In view of the gains in efficiency, none of the automobile producers 
opposed such a limitation on the number of firms in principle, though 
perhaps the American manufacturers were made uncomfortable by a 
governmental stipulation of this sort. What worried each of them was 
the prospect that it might be one of the excluded ones-a prospect that 
was of particular concern to the American firms which already had a 
major stake in the Mexican market. If the Mexican Government were 
to provide a place for its state-owned auto firm (Diesel Nacional), 
favor producers of small cars, attempt to diversify the country's sources 
of foreign investment, and give preference to Mexican-owned firms-
all measures that the government had indicated it was inclined to pur-
sue-then a limitation on the number of firms would surely spell ex-
clusion for one or more of the American producers. Consequently, 
the issue of exclusion became a highly disputed one in the bargaining. 
In the first stage of the negotiations, the American firms lobbied in 
order to remove from the Decree any specific limit on the number of 
firms that would be permitted. In the second stage, a large number 
of firms took steps to insure that they would not be excluded. 
(3) The issues of firm behavior. Like the proposed limitation on the 
number of firms, various measures-standardization of parts, freezing 
of models, limitations on acceptable makes and models-were proposed 
in the Nacional Financiera Report to insure greater efficiency. Each 
of them would increase the volume of each part or unit manufactured, 
and thus allow greater economies of scale. These issues became con-
troversial in the first stage of the bargaining because they threatened 
the dominant competitive strategies of the U.S. firms. By contrast with 
European and Japanese companies (whose competition was just be-
coming a threat to them at home and in Latin America), the U.S. firms 
favored a strategy of product differentiation based on annual model 
changes. They also stressed the differences in performance character-
istics of their motors; the latter were leading candidates for standardi-
zation. 
(4) The issue of ownership. The proposal by the Nacional Financiera 
Report that all of the firms be more than 50 percent Mexican-owned 
reflected the longstanding nationalist orientation of the Mexican state 
and its desire to encourage and protect Mexican private investment. 
Furthermore, participation of Mexican investors might help to ensure 
that the interests of the TNC's subsidiary in Mexico would not be 
sacrificed to the global rationality of the parent company when the 
two were in conflict. 23 This issue, too, was negotiated in the first stage 
23 On the sometimes dubious logic of equity participation as a means to control TNC 
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and came into sharp contention because it threatened a basic operating 
procedure of two of the American firms-one hundred percent owner-
ship of foreign subsidiaries. Ford and General Motors had adopted a 
worldwide policy of not entering into joint ventures with foreign na-
tionals; an exception in Mexico might lead to a similar insistence on 
joint-venture status by other developing countries. 
Although technically an issue of industry structure, the proposed 
restrictions on vertical integration of the terminal firms (limiting them 
to assembly operations, machining of engine blocks, and any manufac-
turing operations in which they had been engaged prior to the Decree) 
were also aimed partly at ownership. Such restrictions would reserve 
a place for the national bourgeoisie in the manufacture of auto parts,24 
particularly important if the American TNCs prevailed on the issue 
of ownership. The transnational firms opposed this limitation as well, 
though with much less vehemence. It would make them dependent on 
the quality, price, and availability of Mexican-made parts, but it did 
not threaten their entrenched worldwide competitive strategies. The 
proposed requirement would limit them to approximately the same 
array of activities in which they were engaged in the United States 
(where, because of risk-sharing considerations, a large number of parts 
are supplied by independent manufacturers). 
The interests of the TNCs and the Mexican state conflicted most 
sharply over the proposals that concerned limiting the number of 
firms, certain issues of firm behavior ( standardization of parts, freez-
ing of models), and ownership restrictions. Consequently, these issues 
formed the major items on the bargaining agenda. Answering the 
questions of who prevailed, and why, requires attention to the bases 
of potential power and to the factors that influence an actor's ability 
to utilize its potential power fully in a particular contest. We will focus 
our attention on the issue of limiting the number of firms. Not only 
was this the point on which the interests of the actors diverged most 
sharply; it was also the one that would most seriously affect the course 
of the industry and the success of future governmental regulatory 
policy. 
behavior, see Bennett and Sharpe, "Controlling the Multinationals: The III Logic 
of Mexicanization," in Lawrence V. Gould, Jr. and Harry Targ, eds., Global Domi-
nance and Dependence: Readings in Theory and Research (Brunswick, Ohio: King's 
Court Communications, forthcoming). 
24 Restrictions on vertical integration would have two other effects as well: they 
would encourage economies of scale by avoiding the duplication of parts manufactured 
in each separate terminal firm, and they would allow better regulation of the require-
ment of 60 percent local content by making it more difficult for the terminal industry 
to manipulate percentages through transfer pricing. 
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III. BARGAINING POWER 
When the Automobile Manufacturing Decree was promulgated in 
August 1962, it was evident that the bargaining of the U.S. trans-
nationals had succeeded in changing considerably the proposals that 
had first been put forward in the Nacional Financiera Report. 25 While 
automobile firms producing for the Mexican market would be required 
to incorporate at least 60 percent of locally manufactured content in 
each of their vehicles, and limits were placed on the vertical integration 
of the firms, the Decree required nothing in the way of Mexicaniza-
tion of the terminal firms. The other proposals regarding firm be-
havior had been dropped. Most importantly, the Decree set no explicit 
limit on the number of firms that would be allowed to operate in 
Mexico: IO of the 18 firms that had applied were approved. (See 
Table.) 
What had transpired in the bargaining? What was the relative power 
of the actors? How and why did they exercise ( or not exercise) the 
potential power at their disposal ? 
SOURCES OF POTENTIAL POWER 
The relative power of actors ought not to be gauged merely from the 
outcome of a conflict. Such a post hoc analysis of power tends to ex-
clude any meaningful analysis of why a particular outcome occurred, 
and forecloses the possibility that one actor had potential power it did 
not exercise.26 In the pluralist approach, potential power is generally 
conceptualized as consisting in the actors' possession of certain re-
sources. The following passage from a distinguished work in the bal-
ance-of-bargaining-power literature illustrates the approach: 
The foreign investor offers capital, know-how ( technological and man-
agerial), some opportunities of commercialization, and, among other 
possibilities, that of a certain structure of industrial development. The 
host country offers access to the home market (particularly in the manu-
facturing sector), access to natural resources (as in extractive industries), 
and access to special comparative advantages ( such as cheap labour) .27 
Variations in these resources may well explain differences in bargain-
ing power. In the Mexican case, the automobile companies had capital, 
25 For the full text of the Decree, see Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n, August 25, 1962. 
26 For a recent employment of these concepts of potential and actual power in a 
general approach to international relations, see Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 
Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown 
1977), rr, 53, and passim. 
27 Constantine V. Vaitsos, lntercounty Income Distribution and Transnational Enter-
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FIRMS ADMITTED UNDER THE I962 AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURING DECREE 
Name of Firm and Date 





FORD MOTOR CO. 
(December 1962) 












































Subsequent Changes in Status 
1978: 40% equity sold to Renault 
1970-1971: Chrysler increased 
its holdings to 99%; name 




1963: 100% equity sold to 
Volkswagen A.G.; name 
changed to VOLKSWAGEN DE 
MEXICO 
1963: 40% equity sold to American 
Motors; remaining 60% acquired by 
Mexican state (SOMEX) 
1963: name changed to 
FABRICA NACIONAL DE 
AUTOM6VILES 
1969: ceased operations 
1963: ceased operations 
1964: ceased operations 
None 
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technology, and administrative and marketing know-how; the govern-
ment controlled access to the domestic market, and could (through tax 
policy, its control of the labor force, and so forth) influence the price 
of various factors of production. An additional resource that strength-
ened the hand of the government was its increasing technical expertise, 
which had been gained by careful study of automobile manufacturing 
in other countries. 28 
It is not an adequate approach, however, to conceive of potential 
power simply in terms of the possession of certain resources. What is 
needed as well is an understanding of how an actor's potential power 
is shaped by the complex web of relationships-relationships with 
actors not directly party to the bargaining-in which each actor is 
enmeshed.29 The relationships in which we are interested in the present 
case are conceptualized somewhat differently in world system theory,3° 
in dependency theory,31 and in models of the international power struc-
ture and of international organization32-to mention a few of the more 
prominent contemporary analyses. There are important issues separat-
ing these approaches, particularly with regard to how asymmetries in 
global relationships are conceptualized and made subject to empirical 
analysis. For the purposes of the present investigation, we intend to 
avoid entering the lists on behalf of any one approach by limiting our 
attention to the particular set of international and transnational rela-
tionships that bear on the case at hand. Most of them have been intro-
duced in Part II (Agenda Setting). We will be especially interested in 
the relationships among the transnational corporations in the interna-
tional automobile industry, the relationships of these transnational 
firms to domestic firms in Mexico, the relationships between the Mexi-
can state and the home governments of the TNCs, the relationships 
28 It is important to note that this resource was different in kind from the other 
resources since it could not (as the other resources could) be used or withheld as a 
sanction. It was an infra-resource rather than an instrumen ta! resource; it allowed 
other resources to be utilized to better advantage. On the notion of infra-resources, 
see Mary F. Rogers, "Instrumental and Infra-Resources: The Bases of Power," Ameri-
can fournal of Sociology, Vol. 79 (May 1974), 1418-33. 
29 This myopia arises partly from the strictly dyadic character of the standard 
pluralist conception of power ("A has power over B," etc.). Such an approacch abstracts 
the actors from all other significant relationships in which they are engaged, and thus 
seeks to locate potential power apart from these other significant relationships. 
30 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Academic Press 
1974). 
31 See, among others, Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," Ameri-
can Economic Review, Vol. 60 (May 1970), 231-36; Fernando Henrique Cardoso and 
Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University 
of California Press 1979). 
32 On these, see Keohane and Nye ( fn. 26), 42-49 and 54-58. 
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between the Mexican state and certain domestic social classes-espe-
cially the bourgeoisie, and the relationships among various ministries 
and agencies of the Mexican state. 
We will argue that the structure of these particular relationships ( 1) 
defines what constitutes a power resource, (2) determines when such 
resources can be employed or withheld, and (3) determines the poten-
tial for the entry of new actors into the conflict as allies or as antag-
onists. 
( 1) The structure of relationships defines what constitutes a power 
resource. One danger of regarding potential power as consisting simply 
of the possession of certain resources is the tendency to an easy but 
dangerously misleading supposition that power resources are "fungi-
ble"-that the possession of power resources gives one a generalized 
capacity which can be employed whenever and wherever one pleases.33 
Power resources are not entirely interchangeable from context to con-
text, or from contest to contest. What serves as a basis of power in one 
situation may be worthless, perhaps even a liability, in another. This 
lack of fungibility of power resources is commonly paid due obeisance: 
what constitutes a power resource depends on the context-on who is 
trying to get whom to do what; the scope and domain must be speci-
fied.34 Quite obviously, the TNCs' control over automotive technology 
gave them potential power only in a context where it was desired that 
automotive products be domestically manufactured. But it is not suffi-
cient ( though power discussions rarely go further) merely to stipulate 
the context-dependency of power resources. Rather than delimiting the 
appropriate context by fiat, we need an analysis that shows how and 
why certain resources come to serve as bases of power in particular 
circumstances. Such an analysis will have to feature the specification 
of relationships of dependency and interdependency in which the 
33 The phrase is from Talcott Parsons, whose suggestion that power be seen on the 
analogy of money leads to the erroneous supposition of the fungibility of power. See 
Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," in Sociological Theory and Modern 
Society (New York: Free Press 1967). For a corrective, see David Baldwin, "Money 
and Power," Journal of Politics, xxxm (August 1971), 578-614. 
34 Thus, for example, Robert Dahl: "The domain of an actor's influence consists of 
the other actors influenced by him. The scope of an actor's influence refers to the 
matters on which he can influence them .... Any statement about influence that does 
not clearly indicate the domain and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless." 
Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (3d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 
1976), 33. 
For a recent and thorough review of the power literature that pays particular atten-
tion to the questions of the fungibility and context dependency of power resources, see 
David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tend-
encies," World Politics, xxx1 (January 1979), 161-94. 
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actors are enmeshed, and which serve to constitute certain resources as 
bases of power. 
To return to our example, if we say that Mexico's need for automo-
tive technology is what made the TNCs' possession of such technology 
a basis of power, we need to ask the further question how and why 
Mexico's need arose; we must not take it for granted. Over several 
decades, the Mexican state had committed itself to rapid economic 
growth; its continuation had become a central basis of the regime's 
legitimacy. Once industrialization of import substitution had been 
adopted as the growth strategy, it had requisites of its own. When the 
strategy was threatened with exhaustion in the late 1950s, the state 
decreed that the automobile sector should commence domestic manu-
facture. These are important features of the context, but they do not 
explain why the transnational corporations were needed for technology 
( and investments). A functional, if not stylish, car of Mexican design 
was probably not beyond the bounds of feasibility. 35 In order to under-
stand Mexico's need for the TNCs, it is necessary to be aware of the 
nature of the class structure that had evolved under import substitu-
tion, and particularly of the relationship between the Mexican state 
and the national bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie had been nurtured for 
thirty years to pace economic growth; its increasing size and power 
and its centrality to the growth project made it one of the prime social 
foundations of the state. Import substitution had been impelled by the 
burgeoning consumer demand of this national bourgeoisie and of the 
middle classes (professionals, managers, petite bourgeoisie, and so 
forth) that had been spawned with it. However, these classes wanted 
what they had become accustomed to: modern, U.S.-style products. 
A Mexican car would not have been acceptable. The relationship of the 
Mexican state to its national bourgeoisie thus demanded that Mexico 
needed the sort of automobile industry that only the transnational 
firms could provide. 
If the context established Mexico's "need" for the technology of the 
automobile TNCs, we may then ask how easily the Mexican state could 
have changed those features of the context that defined the need and 
thus constituted the technology as a power resource. Clearly, not very 
easily: fundamental changes in the strategy of economic growth and 
in the domestic class structure would have been required.36 
35 It is noteworthy that the state-0wned Diesel Nacional S.A. had already begun work 
on a medium truck of its own design. Some of its components were imported, some 
were manufactured under license, and a Detroit engineering firm had been consulted; 
but it was nonetheless a Mexican truck and proved to be a successful venture. 
36 In Keohane and Nye's terminology, Mexico was both "sensitive" and "vulnerable" 
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(2) The structure of relationships determines when power resources 
can be employed or withheld. Relationships of dependence and inter-
dependence in which the actors are enmeshed affect the choice of their 
possessions and attributes that may serve as power resources in a partic-
ular conflict, but other relationships may serve to limit the actors' 
freedom to commit or to withhold their resources at will. The structure 
of relationships defining Mexico's place in the global political economy 
and the Mexican state's relationship to its domestic class structure de-
creed the need for a certain kind of automobile industry; the resources 
of the transnational automobile firms thus became sources of potential 
power. On the other hand, the pattern of competitive relationships 
among these transnational automobile firms (in their worldwide com-
petition) served to constrain them from deploying these resources to 
their own best advantages in bargaining with the Mexican state. 
More precisely, the follow-the-leader pattern of defensive investment 
that made the firms so eager to produce for the Mexican market weak-
ened their potential to withhold their participation if conditions and 
terms were not precisely to their liking. Knickerbocker has called the 
TN Cs' proclivity to defensive investment a "trump card for the LCD": 
"When one member of the club makes a move, the others pant to 
follow; and by realizing this, the LDC is in a position to demand a 
high entrance fee." 37 Since the move to auto manufacture in Mexico 
coincided with heightened international competition, the potential 
power of the Mexican state was enhanced as the ability of the TNCs 
to withhold their resources was weakened. Had the industry been 
differently organized-had it, for example been characterized by collu-
sion and strategies of mutual forebearance, the Mexican Government 
would not have had such substantial potential power. 
In view of the pattern of competition in the international automobile 
industry, the Mexican state's control over access to the Mexican market 
was the most potent power resource available to it in the bargaining, 
but certain relationships constrained its ability to play this "trump 
card" to its fullest advantage. Most importantly, in its pursuit of indus-
trial development by way of import substitution, Mexico had come to 
be dependent upon certain industrialized countries, particularly the 
United States, for trade and capital inflows. These relationships shaped 
to this power resource of the TNCs. "Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness 
within a policy framework" or context, and vulnerability refers to the "relative avail-
ability and costliness of the alternatives the various actors face." Keohane and Nye 
(fn. 26), 12-13. 
37 Knickerbocker (fn. 19), 197, 198. 
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a set of needs for continued flows of trade and capital in a number of 
sectors that limited the state's power in the automobile sector: a favor-
able investment climate had to be maintained if growth was to con-
tinue. The Mexican Government was forcefully reminded of this lim-
itation just when the automobile policy was first being formulated. 
In 1960-1961, relations with the United States took a turn for the worse 
with Mexico's refusal to submit to U.S. pressure to support the trade 
sanctions against the Castro regime. The U.S. Government and press 
criticized the "left-wing" tendencies of the L6pez Mateos government 
-a perception that was reinforced by a variety of new policies toward 
foreign investment. Since taking office, the L6pez Mateos Administra-
tion had nationalized the electric power industry and implemented 
important new policies in the petrochemical and mining sectors, which 
were branded as socialist by certain transnational corporations and 
conservative Mexican business interests. The effect was felt in a flight 
of capital of about $200 million between 1960 and 1961.38 The Mexican 
Government thus had to be cautious in its treatment of the foreign 
( especially U.S.) automobile corporations, lest its policy in this sector 
threaten the wider growth strategy. 
The Mexican state's relationship with its own national bourgeoisie 
also limited its ability to play this trump card of market access to 
fullest advantage. If some wholly foreign-owned firms were to be ap-
proved, it would have been politically disadvantageous not to show a 
measure of favoritism to some domestically-owned firms that were also 
requesting approval. 
(3) The structure of relationships determines the potential for the 
entry of new actors into the confiict as allies or as antagonists. Having 
already established themselves in the Mexican market through their 
assembly operations, the three major U.S.-based firms (Ford, General 
Motors and Fabricas Auto-Mex) could draw on support from their 
consumers and employees, but more importantly from their distrib-
utors and from the suppliers of replacement parts and what few parts 
were procured in Mexico for original equipment. In bargaining, these 
major U.S. firms could (and did) call attention to the disruption that 
would attend their exclusion: replacement parts and service would 
become hard to find; the value of existing vehicles would decline; their 
distributors would be put out of business; and their Mexican employees 
would be out of work. The distributors and parts-supply firms made 
separate representations of these same points, but they were weak and 
38 Miguel Wionczek, El Nacionalismo y la Inversion Extranjera (Mexico, D.F.: 
Siglo xx1 Editores r5)67), 240-4r. 
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disorganized. It was also impossible to muster a wider alliance between 
the transnational firms and the national bourgeoisie-for example de-
picting the attempt to exclude certain TNCs from the market as a 
general attack on private investment. This strategy had been effective 
in other cases of LDC-TNC bargaining,39 but the Mexican state's clear 
intention to accord its national bourgeoisie special treatment in the 
automobile industry through the proposals for Mexicanization and for 
reservation of the supplier industry forestalled such an alliance. 
A more formidable set of allies on which the TNCs drew were their 
home governments. This article is not the place in which to explore 
the relationships between the transnational automobile firms and their 
home governments.40 However, the resources of the latter should no 
more be taken as given than those of the other central actors in the 
bargaining. They resided precisely in the ability to influence the trade 
and capital flows between Mexico and the industrialized countries on 
which Mexico had become dependent. In order to understand the po-
tential power of these home governments we must, therefore, return 
to our first two points: the interdependent relationships in which Mex-
ico was enmeshed defined the need for resources over which the home 
governments had a measure of control, and which thus constituted 
bases of potential power; and the asymmetric character of these trade 
and investment (inter-)dependencies meant that the home govern-
ments were likely to be more free to commit or withhold those re-
sources than the Mexican Government was to choose whether to do 
without them. 
FROM POTENTIAL POWER TO ACTUAL POWER 
How did the two major actors-the TNCs and the Mexican Govern-
ment-transform (or fail to transform) their potential power into 
actual power? As Keohane and Nye point out, "political bargaining is 
the usual means of translating potential into effects, and a lot is often 
39 For such an alliance in the bargaining over copper concessions in Chile, see Moran, 
Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (fn. 3), 
190-97; for such an alliance in Venezuela in the bargaining over oil concessions, see 
Franklin Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press 1975). For a general discussion of the conditions under which such alliance 
between TNCs and the national bourgeoisie may form, see Moran in International 
Organization (fn. 3), 93-95. 
4° For one discussion of these relationships that especially concerns European auto-
mobile firms, see Louis T. Wells, "Automobiles," in Raymond Vernon, ed., Big Busi-
ness and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1974). For a discussion that 
illuminates certain aspects of the relationship of the U.S. and Japanese Governments 
toward their automobile industries, see William Chandler Duncan, U.S.-[ apan Auto-
mobile Diplomacy (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co. 1973). 
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lost in translation."41 Our concern will remain focused on the central 
issue of industry structure: How did the firms prevail over the Mexican 
Government's efforts to limit the number of enterprises in the industry? 
The mobilization of corporate power. The U.S. firms began early to 
mobilize their power to influence the terms of the Decree. As the 
NAFIN committee was preparing its report, Ford was already work-
ing on a detailed, two-volume proposal of its own. In frequent discus-
sions with officials of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (SIC), 
the firms attempted to use their superior know-how to convince Mexi-
can policy planners of the unreasonableness or impracticality of their 
proposals. However, on the issues of exclusion and ownership (manda-
tory Mexicanization would have been tantamount to exclusion of 
Ford and General Motors), and even on certain questions of the 
firms' behavior, the government tecnicos were unmoved.42 Distributors 
and parts suppliers also provided little leverage. Instead, a major key 
to the success of the TNCs was the support they could mobilize from 
the U.S. Government. 
The Minister of Industry and Commerce was informed by the United 
States Ambassador that the Department of State would look unfavor-
ably on the exclusion of the U.S. firms. Other high officials of the Min-
istry were told that any such exclusion would be viewed as a "not very 
friendly act."43 Precisely what was said, however, is not as important 
as how anything said on this issue by the U.S. Government would be 
understood. Its explicit backing of the interests of these transnational 
firms meant that automobile policy would be linked with, and would 
affect, what happened in other spheres of the bilateral relationship, 
and that sanctions might be employed beyond those strictly under the 
control of the three firms. 44 In view of the strained relations over Cuba 
and the recent capital flight, the President, Ministers and other officials 
of the Mexican Government had to be particularly sensitive to the 
pronouncements of high corporate executives and U.S. Government 
officials. 
41 Keohane and Nye (fn. 26), rr. Cf. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the 
Politics of Dependence (fn. 3), 169-215. 
42 It does seem, however, that they did not fully appreciate how much the pattern 
of oligopolistic competition strengthened their hand, nor how zealously the firms 
would press their cases in their eagerness to be included. 
43 A well-publicized visit by U.S. Ambassador Thomas Mann to the plant of Fabricas 
Auto-Mex in August 1961 made it clear that the United States was interested in the 
treatment of this firm ( which was majority Mexican-owned), as well as of Ford and 
G.M.'s wholly U.S.-owned subsidiaries. 
44 Another case of U.S. Government intervention on behalf of Ford, G.M., and 
Chrysler over somewhat similar issues is documented in Duncan (fn. 40). 
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Pressure may also have been forthcoming from the West German 
Government to ensure that at least one German manufacturer was ap-
proved. In any case, the desire of the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce to include at least one manufacturer of a small inexpensive car 
(auto popular), their unwillingness to rely wholly on the state-owned 
Diesel Nacional (Renault) for this purpose, and the Mexican owner-
ship of Promexa (Volkswagen) at the time of approval were probably 
sufficient to assure the acceptance of Volkswagen as a licensee. (The 
Mexicans sold out to the German parent company a few months later.) 
The acceptance of Nissan's application two years after the legal dead-
line for approval, however, can only be explained by looking at another 
relationship between a TNC and its home government.45 The Japanese 
Government utilized an additional and unlikely power resource to gain 
approval for Nissan: cotton. 
In 1963, cotton was the single most important source of foreign 
exchange for Mexico, accounting for earnings of US$196 million-over 
20 percent of Mexico's total foreign exchange earnings.46 In addition, 
taxes on cotton exports brought in about US$15 million per year.47 
About 70 percent of cotton exports went to Japan, Mexico's most im-
portant trade partner after the United States. The balance of trade 
between the two countries ran strongly in Mexico's favor. In 1962, for 
example, while Mexico's exports to Japan were valued at US$127.8 
million, Mexico's imports from Japan totaled only US$22.6 million. 
For a number of years, the Japanese Government had been pressuring 
Mexico to increase its imports; it even offered a loan of US$roo million 
if there were some improvement in this regard.48 The Japanese Govern-
ment was therefore able to use its position as Mexico's major cotton 
buyer as a lever: it threatened to cut cotton imports if Nissan's applica-
tion were not approved. The threat worked. 
Because of its historical commitment to the national bourgeoisie, the 
Mexican state's capitulation in approving some wholly foreign-owned 
firms weakened its ability-and perhaps its resolve-to turn down ap-
plications by some firms that were wholly or majority Mexican-owned. 
State-owned Diesel Nacional (DINA) had been assured of a place in 
45 An application from a wholly Mexican-owned venture to manufacture Datsuns 
had been turned down during the normal period of application, though the approval 
of Reo allowed the manufacture of one Japanese make (Toyota). Since Reo failed 
during the first year, however, no Japanese makes were initially included in the 
Mexican market. 
46 Lie. Raul Salinas Lozano, Memoria de Labores, 1963 (Mexico, D.F.: Secretaria de 
Industria y Comercio 1963), 136-37. 
47 Comercio Exterior, May 1961, p. 287. 
48 Comercio Exterior, March 1963, p. 167. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 15:44:52 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
82 WORLD POLITICS 
the industry from the beginning. Vehfculos Automotores Mexicanos 
(V AM) was a well-established venture of Sociedad Mexicana de 
Credito Industrial, one of the country's largest industrial development 
banks. Fabricas Auto-Mex's hand was strengthened by its being major-
ity-owned by a wealthy and well-connected Mexican family. In the 
cases of Impulsora Mexicana Automotriz, Reo, and Representaciones 
Delta ( all private firms, 100 percent Mexican-owned), political favor-
itism and perhaps bribes rather than technical competence or financial 
clout were responsible for their being approved when other domesti-
cally owned ventures were rejected. 
In all, ten firms were approved to manufacture in Mexico, far more 
than the NAFIN Report had recommended and far more than the 
size of the Mexican market warranted. When the government realized 
that it would not prevail in limiting the number of firms, it pinned its 
hopes on competition to winnow the industry down over the next few 
years. To some extent, that was a vain hope: the NAFIN Report had 
correctly predicted that competition would not drive out subsidiaries of 
the transnational firms, because of the ability of these firms to cross-
subsidize their various international operations. Also, steps were taken 
to protect the national firms (both public and private) from the size 
and superior resources of the foreign firms. A system of production 
quotas limited the output of all firms and thus ensured a share of the 
market for the Mexican firms-thereby further reducing the possibility 
of elimination through competition. 
On some issues, the Mexican Government did succeed in accom-
plishing its goals. The firms that had been approved would be required 
to manufacture 60 percent of each vehicle in Mexico. Further, these 
firms would be limited to the machining of the motor and the final 
assembly of vehicles. Other manufacturing activities would be reserved 
for a supplier industry that needed to be created-and the burden 
would fall squarely on the transnational firms in the terminal industry 
to assist in this development.49 
The opposition of the American firms and their allies proved suffi-
cient to have removed from the auto decree the other key require-
ments concerning product differentiation-freezing of models, stand-
ardization of parts, and limits on the number of acceptable makes and 
models. The question of the exclusion of these firms had been a par-
ticularly sharp issue in the bargaining, and when they prevailed on 
49 In later bargaining, some of the terminal firms secured approval for more vertical 
integration. A number of firms now have approval to cast their own engine blocks, 
Volkswagen is permitted to make its own body stampings, and so forth. 
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this, they won as well the right to manufacture automobiles in their 
accustomed manner-with product differentiation and annual model 
changes. 
Organizational constraints on the exercise of state power. The gov-
ernment's proposals for rationalizing the auto industry had been 
undermined on certain fundamental issues-the number of firms, the 
ownership of the terminal industry, product differentiation. In view 
of the potential power of the state, it is important to ask why the 
state's trump card-the pattern of oligopolistic competition in the 
automobile industry-was largely un- or under-played. 
At first glance, there is a simple and plausible answer: certain char-
acteristics of the structure of dependence-particularly political and 
economic relations with the United States and Japan-allowed the 
TNCs to muster the support of their home governments and change 
the game to one in which Mexico's card was no longer trump. But it is 
possible that the Mexican state could have acted differently. There 
were alternative strategies (recognized by at least some high officials 
at the time) that it might have pursued to take better advantage of its 
potential power. 
In the case of the U.S. firms, a divide-and-rule strategy could have 
been tried, playing one of them against the other two. Alternatively, 
the government could have yielded on the question of limiting the 
number of firms, but insisted that these firms submit to much stiffer 
regulations on firm behavior, such as limits on product differentiation 
and on ownership. In the case of Nissan, the state might have re-
sponded to the Japanese Government's pressure by negotiating for the 
entrance of substantial Japanese investment in some other industrial 
structure, or even by calling its bluff: as some Mexican officials were 
aware (particularly in the Finance Ministry), Japan could not easily 
have found suitable alternatives for the long-fibered Mexican cotton 
needed for its textile industry. 
The point is not that these strategies would necessarily have suc-
ceeded, but rather that the Mexican state had potential power and 
alternative courses of action that it did not employ. Why not? 
When an actor in a power conflict is a collectivity rather than a 
single person, there may be organizational constraints on the utiliza-
tion of potential power. For internal reasons, the actor may not be able 
to draw on all of the potential power that is theoretically available to 
it. With a complex entity like the state, such internal constraints may 
stem from a lack of the organizational coordination that is necessary 
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to wield its potential power to full effectiveness. In the case at hand, 
we must examine the relations among specific agencies and depart-
ments and the bureaucratic politics of policy formation inside the 
Mexican Government. "0 We will confine ourselves to three aspects of 
internal lack of unity. 
I. Not only did the two ministries that were centrally concerned 
with industrial policy ( the very powerful Finance Ministry and the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce), fail to coordinate their auto-
mobile policy; they were seriously at odds during much of the plan-
ning period. Prior to the Lopez Mateos Administration, the Finance 
Ministry had controlled the two principal policy instruments for in-
dustrial planning-tax policy and import tariffs and quotas. Such 
steps as were taken to encourage greater local content in the automo-
bile industry were the work of the Finance Ministry's capable Depart-
ment of Financial Studies. When the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce was reorganized in 1959, it was given control ( among other 
measures to strengthen it) over import tariffs and quotas; questions of 
automobile policy became principally its concern. The Finance Min-
istry resisted the diminution of its control over import policy, how-
ever, and the conflict between the two ministries became quite sharp, 
at times requiring presidential mediation. The Director of the Depart-
ment of Financial Studies ( who had been in his post a number of 
years, and had considerable experience with the automobile industry) 
supported a much stronger automobile policy along the lines of the 
original NAFIN Report. Had there been effective coordination be-
tween these two ministries, Industry and Commerce would have had 
powerful support for taking a tougher line. However, Industry and 
Commerce proceeded alone, using import controls as its only tool. 
(Tax policy toward the industry was not negotiated until after the 
19fo Decree, and the Finance Ministry flatly refused to grant the 
firms any fiscal incentives.) The making and implementing of auto-
mobile policy became a means by which Industry and Commerce es-
tablished a sphere of autonomy, but the cost was a diminution of the 
state's effective power. 51 
5° Cf. the discussion of divisions within the Mexican state as weakening its bargain-
ing position vis-a-vis foreign drug companies, in Gerefli (fn. 3), 279-84. Organizational 
constraints within the TNCs themselves, while beyond the scope of this paper, are also 
important to a full analysis of the transformation of potential into actual power. See 
Gerefli, ibid. For a broad general discussion, see also Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy 
and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise (Cam-
bridge: M.I.T. Press 1962). 
51 Parallel to this lack of coordination was the failure of Industry and Commerce to 
make use of the state's own automobile firm, Diesel Nacional, nominal control over 
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2. There were also serious divisions inside the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce. The Director and Sub-Director of Industries had been 
deeply involved in the technical studies that preceded the bargaining. 
Like their counterparts in the Department of Financial Studies with 
whom they had developed close informal relationships ( the antag-
onism was chiefly at the Ministerial level), they believed that a much 
stronger policy could be successfully carried forward. Their superiors, 
however, the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary, felt that modera-
tion, and compromise with the companies, was necessary. It is difficult 
to know for certain why these top officials were reluctant to take a 
tougher position, but interviews with officials in and out of the Min-
istry indicate that there were several factors. For one, there was a 
difference of goals. While there was broad agreement in the Ministry 
that limiting the number of firms was important, these top officials 
also placed a high priority on diversification of the sources of foreign 
investment; hence, they were inclined to look favorably on the appli-
cations of, for example, Promexa (Volkswagen) and Nissan. 
Moreover, the political situation of the Secretary and Assistant Sec-
retary made it somewhat difficult for them to assume a tougher posi-
tion in the face of corporate pressure. In the Mexican political system, 
the change of President every six years brings with it changes in all 
major policy-making posts. Although a person is unlikely to retain the 
same position, many move to new positions of importance.52 Cabinet 
Secretaries are typically the strongest candidates for selection as the 
next President. Among other factors, a politician's future will depend 
on the immediate political consequences of his decisions in the pre-
vious sexennium-the friends and enemies he has made, the contro-
versies in which he has been involved. Thus, the incentive to pursue 
risk-minimizing strategies and to judge policies narrowly in terms of 
their short-run political consequences is strong. Since the deleterious 
effects of admitting too many firms to the industry would not be felt 
immediately, only an unusual person would have risked a full-scale 
confrontation with Ford, General Motors and the U.S. Government, 
or with the Japanese Government-unless he had the support of the 
President. 
which lay with yet a third ministry, National Properties. DINA could have been a 
valuable source of technical and financial information about automobile manufacturing; 
it could have been allotted a place in the industry which would have made it a tool 
of industrial policy (a competitive check on the other firms). DINA's earlier troubles, 
however, hardly inspired confidence. 
52 Peter Smith, "Does Mexico Have a Power Elite?" in Richard S. Weinert and Jose 
Luis Reyna, eds., Authoritarianism in Mexico (Philadelphia: ISHI Publications 1977). 
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Finally, there was a close connection between the Ford Company 
and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. It was not simply a per-
sonal relationship between the manager of Ford de Mexico and the 
Minister: from the very beginning of the Lopez Mateos Administra-
tion, Ford had openly supported the Ministry's goal of moving toward 
the manufacturing of automobiles. In 1960, following a strategy he 
had recently employed in Argentina, Ford's manager put his staff to 
work on a lengthy feasibility report and an accompanying proposal 
of what Ford itself would be willing to do in Mexico. He reckoned-
quite rightly-that such early cooperation would give Ford an inside 
track on approval and policy input that would result in a policy that 
the company would find amenable. How much Ford's influence was 
responsible for the divisions within the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce, and how much it was made possible by divisions already there, 
is difficult to determine. 
3. Because of the centralization of power in the hands of a Mexican 
President, it is possible that his explicit direction and firm support 
could have forged the inter- and intra-Ministerial unity necessary to 
act more forcefully in putting forward a stronger automobile policy. 
Indeed, interviews show that a lack of direction left key officials on 
their own (and thus made it rational for them to pursue risk-mini-
mizing strategies), and that specific directives to "ease up" on the 
transnational firms, and to give favorable consideration to applications 
from certain Mexican-owned firms, filtered down from the President 
himself at crucial points in the bargaining. In the context of the Mexi-
can political system, only resolute guidance from the President could 
have fended off the pressures that were being brought to bear, and this 
guidance was not forthcoming. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The bargaining conflict between the Mexican state and the transna-
tional automobile corporations between 1960 and 1964 was only the 
first round of what has proved to be an ongoing struggle. There have 
been a number of new negotiations, the most important of which took 
place in 1968-1969 and again in 1976-1977; but the initial round was 
the most decisive encounter because it set the terms for all subsequent 
bargaining. 
Studies of bargaining power in natural resource industries have 
shown that the power of the state is lowest at the time of initial bar-
gaining because of uncertainties about the amount, quality, and costs 
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of extraction of the natural resources. Once the large initial investments 
have been made, however, the balance of power swings dramatically in 
favor of the state: the uncertainties are reduced and the fixed invest-
ments are "hostage" to the LDC.53 
In a high-technology, consumer-goods manufacturing sector such as 
the automobile industry, the situation is often reversed. Access to the 
domestic market is the state's principal basis of bargaining power, and 
can be used most effectively at the point of initial investment. After 
that, the firms are entrenched in the host country through their rela-
tionships with suppliers, distributors, labor, and consumers. Because 
such manufacturing enterprises are integrated into the local economy 
to a far higher degree than resource extractors, they establish relation-
ships within the host country which significantly enhance their bar-
gaining power, both by reinforcing the host country's needs for their 
kind of production and products and by being able to mobilize domes-
tic allies. And so long as the industry is dependent upon external 
sources of technology, the possibility of nationalization by the host 
country is not a credible threat. 
Other things being equal, then, the balance of bargaining power in 
such a manufacturing industry may with time shift toward the trans-
national firms rather than toward the LDC. The first bargaining en-
counter between the Mexican state and the automobile TNCs was 
therefore of paramount importance: here, the structure of the industry 
was first laid down; the state never again had the power to restructure 
the industry, and each subsequent renegotiation of policy occurred 
within the bounds set down in the first bargaining encounter. Both 
the problems and the alternative possibilities are defined within this 
structure. 
The theoretical approach taken in this paper could be employed in 
the analysis of these subsequent bargaining encounters in the Mexican 
automobile industry, as well as in the analysis of bargaining between 
TNCs and the governments of other less developed countries, and in 
other industries. We have been concerned with two central issues: 
agenda setting and bargaining power. 
Agenda setting. Understanding the bargaining agenda requires a 
knowledge of the actors ( or interests) that obtain access to the bargain-
ing arena and of those that are excluded. The character of Mexico's 
political institutions explains not only the exclusion of labor from the 
53 On this argument, see Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of De-
pendence (fn. 3), 157-62. 
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bargaining table, but also the promotion of certain interests of the 
national bourgeoisie by the Mexican state ( despite the rather small 
role played by Mexican entrepreneurs in the bargaining). Once it is 
clear which actors and interests are to be included, the points of conflict 
and of convergence of interest among the major actors must be ana-
lyzed. It should not be supposed that the interests of TNCs and LDC 
governments conflict across the board: the points of convergence of 
interests simply do not become bargaining issues. In the case of Mexico 
after World War II, a strategy of import substitution laid the basis for 
substantial convergence of interests among the government and TNCs 
in a range of manufacturing industries. The convergence of interests 
in the automobile industry-given its worldwide dynamics of competi-
tion-went no further than assembly operations, however. The exercise 
of state power was necessary to induce the auto firms to commence 
domestic manufacture. The state's requirement for local content was 
not the most controversial proposal, however, because it merely pro-
pelled the firms further along a competitive trajectory on which they 
were already engaged worldwide. But other proposals-a strict limita-
tion on the number of firms, ownership restrictions, and constraints on 
product differentiation-did become major points of conflict in the 
bargaining: they threatened the established competitive strategies of 
the firms in the industry (particularly of the U.S.-based firms, which 
were the most active in the bargaining because of their prior penetra-
tion of the market). 
Bargaining power. The potential power available to each actor to set-
tle the contested issues cannot be understood as consisting simply of its 
possession of certain resources. Whether a resource can serve as a source 
of potential power depends on the context-particularly on the struc-
ture of domestic and international relationships in which each actor is 
enmeshed. Such relationships help in defining which resources can 
serve as bases of potential power. It was, for example, the relationship 
between the Mexican state and certain domestic classes that established 
Mexico's "need" for a domestic automobile industry and thus allowed 
the TNCs' control of automobile technology to serve as their power 
resource. Such relationships also determine when power resources can 
be employed or withheld, as demonstrated in the pattern of competitive 
relationships in the world's automobile oligopoly that made each of the 
firms eager to gain access to the Mexican market. Finally, such rela-
tionships define the potential for the entry of new actors into the 
conflict as allies-as shown by the firms' mobilization of domestic 
suppliers and distributors and of their home governments. 
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Potential power must be carefully distinguished from actual power: 
an actor may have sources of power upon which it does not draw 
effectively. In this conflict, the TNCs drew more effectively upon their 
potential power than did the Mexican state. The potential power that 
accrued to the Mexican state from the pattern of oligopolistic competi-
tion in the world's automobile industry was an advantage which it did 
not utilize fully. In order to understand the reasons, we must realize 
that the host government is not a single unified entity. Conflicts within 
and especially between various agencies, and the lack of central direc-
tion from the President weakened the Mexican state's ability to draw 
fully upon its potential power. 
